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A preliminary taxonomy of choice strategies open to a consumer
was developed and used as a basis for examining the perceived simplifying
and optimizing potentials of the respective strategies. The studies indi-
cate decision makers do anticipate that different choice strategies differ
in the cognitive exertion required to apply them. The relative diffi-
culty of using different strategies varies as the number of options
being considered varies.

A consumer seeking to choose one option from an array of
i
many faces two often antagonistic considerations: (1) his desire
to accurately choose that option which will optimize eventual
"consumption benefits", and (2; his immediate concerns related
.
to the difficulties of the choice task itself. Consumers are
equipped with limited information-handling capacity and often
operate under relatively heavy information loads. In trying to
lessen congitive strain and quickly escape the unpleasant state
of multi-product conflict, they are likely to adjust the choice
strategy they apply to the environment at hand. In some cases,
the desire to simplify will dominate the desire to optimize, and
vice versa. A number of plausible strategies for integrating
data on available products and choosing among them can be proposed.
Since these strategies will vary in attractiveness as simplifying
or optimizing procedures, searching for a general "best" model
•Of the' consumer choice process is' chasing a will-of-the-wisp.
The key question is "Under what decision making conditions are
the respective strategies applied, and why?"
A necessary first step in answering that question is to gain
i
insight into the difficulties people experience (or anticipate
experiencing} in executing different strategies, and into how
these appear to people as choice-optimizing techniques. Execu-
tion simplicity should vary as information load varies. Specula-
ting that since Strategy A seems simpler than Strategy B it will
be used in difficult conditions is premature until we learn whether
Strategies C, D, ... Z are simpler than A or B. This paper attempts
a reasonable exhaustive identification of the choice strategies open
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to consumers » then explores their relative status as simplifying
or optimising devices.
A BASIC TAXONOMY 0" CHOICE STRATEGIES
A review of normative and descriptive decision-making re-
search revealed a number of formal model3. The necessary assump-
tions underlying these were analyzed, as were other possible
assumptions suggested by the comparisons. The fifteen basic
models emerging are characterized below within a two-dimensional
structure suggested by the comparisons (Figure 1). The two dimen-
sions,, labeled "data combination process" (COMB) and "choice rule"
(RULE), organize the models in a way which may be meaningful in
understanding general simplifying principles.
The models differ on whether they assume a consumer cognitively
combines cues about options in a "compensatory" or "noncompensatory"
2
way. Compensatory strategies picture an individual averaging
(or adding) cues such that positive and negative cues have a
balancing C nsating) impac** on his overall impression of the
option [11. Adding end averaging are not identical but the dif-
ference won't b t for our immediate purposes. Equal weighting
(AVG ) or d ential weighting (AVG^) of the various data dimen- •
sions can be assumed. Noncompensatory models assume the consumer
combines cues such that the presence (absence) of one cue may not
compensate at all for the presence (absence) of others. Examples
of noncompensatory strategies are the lexicographic (LEX), conjunc-
tive (CONJ), disjunctive (DISJ), mlnimax, and maximax. These are
described below.

These respective COMB procedures may tbe used in conjunction
with several rules for discriminating the final choice* The
choice rule used may affect how simple any of the COMB strategies
are to apply in practice. One distinction among possible choice
rules is whether the consumer compares options against each other
or affi^st some mental criteria. If we assume he uses a "choose
the best" (BEST) rule, he is necessarily seen as comparing option
vs. option. Alternately, he might establish mental cutoffs as the
basis for his decision. Using cutoffs may simplify his task since
he avoids tedious option vs. options comparisons, but he may often
find several options surpassing his cutoff(s). This leaves him
hanging in conflict and implies additional processing of some
sort before he can finally choose one (or n). Formal descriptions
of cutoff-based models (e.g., conjunctive or disjunctive models
[2, 3, ^ 9 5 j Sj) haven't specified solutions for this remaining
dilemma. To really make a cutoff-based strategy simple to execute,
a person may add a "choose the first one (or n)" rule. Cutoff-
based models including a FIRST rule should be distinguished from
those not specifying any particular basis for making a unique choice
(herein labeled ALL rules).
This structure is offered as a preliminary way for organizing
the various strategies open to consumers according to underlying
assumptions. Often data combination models are defined without
any explicit choice rule , or models of the "within product" evalua-
tion process aren't distinguished from those describing a "between
product" choice process. The structure does suggest some fundamental
differences which may relate to simplifying or optimizing difference.-5 .

The specific strategies cited in Figure 1 are describe.,.', in detail
below.
We assume the output of a consumer's cognitive averaging of
data on an option is an estimate of the overall utility " or ''affect'*
of the option, i.e., he locates each option on his: global utility
dimension [13 . Given that output, a common assumption has been
that he treats this global dimension as continuous and picks the
option offering highest utility, a BEST rule. Another plausible
assumption is that he sets up a cutoff on his global utility dimen-
sion. He might then cither class options vhose compensator!ly
created utility rating surpasses his minimum ired utility level
as "acceptable", or* simplify further and choose the first one found
offering "acceptable" overall utility. He is seen as performing
something akin to a mental discriminant analysis [12 , 15, 24J.
The key point is that compensatory COMB models can accomodate
BEST ^ FIRST, or ALL choice rules, just as noncompensatory models.
Greater variety exists among non-compensatory nodels [see 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 21,, 253. wa formal mod' Is reviewed, three
qualify as BEST models. A lexicographic (LEX) model pictures the
consumer oi
3
,ve importance of evalu* tive dimensions
in his mine" «, then comparin ptions on the single most important
dimension. If he ^ks one opti urpasses the otha on that
dimension 9 he chooses it. If he still cannot & «ig
several options, he compares those on the second most important
dimension, and so forth. An option's status on one dimension offor
absolutely no compensation for less-than-par status c:. dimensions
preceding it in the hierarchy. As formally developed the ".•IX mod-

pits option vs. option using a BEST rule at every stage. (The LEX
l
i
model shouldn't be construed as merely a sequential processing model,
For example, sequential processing is a perfectly legitimate assump-
tion within the context of AVG models.) MINIMAX and MAXIMAX join
LEX in this ceil of the structure. A consumer applying MINIMAX
compares the options on their worst attributes, rejecting one if
another's '"worst" attribute is less offensive or if another has
fewer "worst" attributes which are equally as offensive. Ha
minimizes maximum losses (or maximizes minimum gains if losses
aren't possible), MAXIMAX implies a consumer compares options on
their best attributes, choosing one over another if its "best"
attribute is more desirable or if it possesses more "best" attri-
butes of equal desirability.
Both the conjunctive (CONJ) and disjunctive (DISJ) models
assume the individual sets up minimum cutoffs on each dimension.
In CONJ, he reasons it has any below-cutoff features, reject
it." DISJ is a mirror image to CONJ ..."if it has any above-cutoff
features, it is acceptable." As formally developed neither CONJ
nor DISJ necessarily leads to a unique choice; adding a FIRST rule
handles this in a simple way. Russ [16 j and Tversky [22] have
independently t is in essence a sequential conjunctive
model. The consumer sets up cutoffs, then eliminates options not
surpassing the cutoff on the most important dimension, the second
most important, a: on. Russ labels this a "satisiex" model
and Tversky "elimination by aspects"."' For clarity, we will call
it simply a "sequential conjunctive" (CONJ-SEQ) model. In any case,
the eventual choice from CONJ and COMJ-SEQ strategies is identical,
assuming identical cutoffs,

The relative status of the strategies described as sim-
i
plifying or as optimizing techniques is not immediately clear.
An optimizing strategy imast offer the consumer the chance to
do justice to his own objective function. His final choice
should emerge from a process which inputs in some way the
status of the options on ail subjectively nontrivial dimensions.
Three strategies allow him to choose an option based on a posi-
tive differentiation on only one dimension: LEX, MAXIMAX, and
DISJ. In contrast, ail compensatory strategies and CONJ necessi-
tate considering all dimensions of non-zero importance. These
latter strategies might be viewed by consumers as having more
optimizing potential than LEX, DISJ, or MAXIMAX.
Simplification potential is likewise not a simple problem.
The consumer is essentially asking two questions: (1) how much
cognitive exertion will it take to execute this strategy? ; and
(2) how likely is this strategy to actually discriminate a
unique choice and end my conflict? He is concerned then with
his maximum mental exertion during any stage in using the
strategy, plus the total number of stages needed.
Several pri les for simplifying can be proposed. In
general differential weighting of the available information
should tend to s: ify the judgment task. Focusing on one
dimension at , time is one dramatic form of differential weighting.
Cihe effective weight of that one dimension becomes 1, and all
others 0.) In the multidimensional case, a procedure (e.g., LEX)
in which considering only one dimension could bo determinant
should offer more simplifying potential than one requiring

consideration of multiple dimensions (e^ /G), "Jsin^, cutoffs
is another- dramatic Df differential weighting. For multi-
dimensional options, procedures (e.g., CONJ or DISJ) where
discovery of a single- datum could be determinant should offer
more simplifying potential than those necessitating consideration
of every cue in every case (e.g., AVG 4 MINIMAX, or MAXIMAX).
Where cutoffs are us-^.d, many options qualify. If only k_
of the total set n of available options can be chosen, a FIRST
rule eliminates the possibility of further processing effort.
VZ CrIQICS ENVIKQ'fTrfENT
The basic choice environment facing a consumer contains
factors affecting his desire to find the optimal option (e.g.,
the magnitude of possible penalties for a mistake) and factors
inducing him to try tc simplify his information processing task.
The latter are most relevant here. As a starting point, the
concept of " oad" [173 offers a parsimonious and
powerful model applicable to a1 1 choice environments. Informa-
tion load is defined as the amount of information a person must
handle per unit of time. Pr reasing information
lead wi] : slative urgenc; , needs.
Information load is a function of at least four variables. An
increase in load could rest, reasing the time available
for processing or increasing the amount of information to be
processad. Amount - formation can be increased Ly increasing
(a) the number of cues to be considered per option, (b) the number
of options to be considered, or (c) the number of distracting cues
(extraneous to the choice task) present.

The effect of these variables——number of options , number of
cues per option, distractions, and time pressure—-on decision
processes h sceived surprisingly little attention [20].
Increasing the number of cues available per option has been
shown to increcise the decision-maker's confidence in the opti-
mality of his choice ough his actual accuracy doesn't increase
and may degenerate [6, 8, 9, 14.]. There is some evidence, that
the linear predicts y of his judgments decreases as cues per
option increase \ however, Jaccoby et al. [9, 10] reported the
number of subjects whose choices were predictable by a subjectively
weighted compensatory model increased as cues per option increased
(as long as the number of options were relatively low). This may
have been an artifact of not having equally relevant cues available
in all conditions, Wright [26] found that the weighting of nega-
tive data tended to increase as time pressure and distraction
increased. These results may indicate more frequent use of a
CONJ strategy under difficult conditions.
Adaptation:"; in choi trategies as the number of options to
be considered incrv haven* t been examined although this factor
may cause great difd y for a consumer'. Jacoby et ai, [10]
found that processing increased substantially as options
increased from four to sixteen, hut rose only slightly as cues
per option increased. of the major questions examined in
this study was how the number of options to be considered affected
the difficulty of executing different choice strategies.

STUDY I: EXPECT S ABOUT THE CHOICE STRATEGIES
—, .~__ —.—_-~ —. , r
Procedure and Siib jccta
Subjects were 300 men and women enrolled as undergraduate stu-
dents in a large midwestern university. Each was given a concise
written description of a strategy to use in choosing among sets of
electronic resistors, Lt explained that the status of each resistor
on four dimensions would be given and identified the nature of these
dimensions. The procedure to be used in choosing among resistors
was then spelled out clearly. Each subject was asked to read the
rule description carefully and then to complete a questionnaire
on his expectations of what the experience of trying to use that
procedure would be like. Subjects in Study I did not actually try
to apply the procedure. To promote understanding of the rule, sub-
jects were encouraged to reread the rule description whenever they
wanted while responding to the questionnaire.
The fifteen strategies developed in the introduction were used
as stimuli. The c< ntailed averaging across each
of the four dimensions, tre .verage" ratings as contributing
zero ar»d any : rage" es exactly balancing cut any
rating below ' dimensions were to be given
equal weighting, F j, ra iimension were to contri-
bute twice ar .valuation as ratings on the other dimen-
sions. In two des EST and AVGd :BEST) subjects were
told to choose the resistor in the set with the highest overall
evaluation ace-. g to the averaging process. FIRST and ALL caveats
were added to isatory rules by setting up a "positive net evalua-
tion" (greater than zero) as a threshold, For FIRST versions, the
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subject was Instructed to evaluate each resistor in the order he
encountered it in the set and to choose the first he found with
a positive net evaluation. ALL versions instructed subjects to
choose every" resistor i t whose net evaluation was positive.
Three non-ccmpen ' BEST rules were described; LEX 4 MAXIMAX,
and MINIMAX. LEX e .ished en ordering cf the dimensions. If com-
parisons on the first dimension indicated a superior resistor, it
was to be chosen, If not, the next dimension was to be consulted,
comparisons res and so on. For MAXIMAX the resistor having
the most "greatly above average" attributes was to be chosen.
If several resistors were equivalent using this test, the one having
the most "somewhat above average" attributes should be chosen, and
so on. For the MINIMAX rule, the resistor having the fewest "greatly
Low overage" attributes was to be chosen. If several resistors
in a set had the same number of non- "greatly below average" attri-
butes s the c .th the fewest "somewhat below average" attributes
was to oe selected, .and so on. CONJ, CONJ-SEQ, and DISJ rules were
established by m cutoffs on each dimension: two cutoffs
were set at "av igs and two at "somewhat above average"
ratings. For D bhe only necessary condition for a resistor to
be chosen was possession of any attribute surpassing a cutoff. For
CONJ, the requi: . for c was that all a resistor's attributes
surpass the cutoffs . For the CONJ-SEQ models the same conditions
held as for the COL els but the order in which the cutoff-
tests were to be executed across dimensions was specified. FIRST
rules again instructed the judge to evaluate resistors in order
and choose the first meeting the criteria.

11
Analysis
i
To explore whether the COMB and RULE differences had general
effects on subjects 1 simplifying expectations, their responses were
analyzed in 2 x 35 AN0VAS The fifteen separate utiles were collapsed
into six categories as shown in Figure 1. Table 1 summarises The
treatment means.
Subjects were asked how difficult they anticipated it would
be to keep the rule described in mind while carrying out the choice
process. (For all response scales in Table 1, lower scores indicate
either "less difficult' 1 or "more optimal".) The main RULE effect
was significant (F = 10.^6, p < .001). FIRST rules were seen as
easiest to retain , followed by BEST and then ALL rules. This order
held for both Compensatory and Non-Compensatory classes. COMB
effect was not reliable (F = 2.15, p < .15), but the means were
in the expected direction. Compensatory rules were seen as some-
what more difficult to retain than Non-Compensatory rules.
Anticipated confusion while using the rule was significantly
affected by bo MB (F = 3.S9, p < .05) and RULE (F = «+.16, p <
.02). Subjects anticipated less frequent oc ion for FIRST
rules and for Non-Compensatory rules although this latter effect
was confined to FIRST or EEST versions, This pattern of results
held fairly closely for measures of the "anticipated amount of
concentration required (six or twelve options to choose from)
and anticipated speed with which the decision 'could be made (six
or twelve options to choose from) u In each case, 'both the COMB
and RULE effect were significant but not the interaction. The
pattern of means was also similar; in each case, FIRST and
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Non- Compensatory- strategies were viewed as the simpler strategies
with Non-Compensatory FIRST and BEST rules seen as causing the
least cognitive strair
When subjects were asked Dout the respective strategies as
methods for making ideal choices and as methods which could be
easily defended to others, only the meiin COi-IB effect was reliable.
Compensatory strategies were seen as more efficient for making
ideal choices (F = ^.19, p < .0.5) and more readily defensible
(F = 2 5 83, p < .10). Although the data indicate that BEST strate-
gies, particularly Compensatory-BEST, received somewhat better
ratings on these measures than FIRST or ALL strategies , the dif-
ference wasn't reliable. This finding is somewhat unexpected.
Finally, subjects' estimates of how often they used the procedure
described in making everyday choices didn't differ significantly
.
Follow-up questioning revealed many subjects felt they couldn't
give a meaningful response to this last question since "it depends
on the situation.*' ie notion of a general choice strategy
apparently didn't match their own experiences.
The proposed clcv f strategies apparently has
some validity in differentiating them according to their relative
simplifying and opt ng potential. There was of course varia-
tion in perceptions of the separate strategies and variation between
strategies collapsed together by the proposed system. To gain
insight into other systems, an exploratory factor analysis of the
responses to the fifteen strategies was performed. The goal was
simply to see how the strategies clustered together based on sub-
jects ' usage expectations. Ideally, we might find. these groupings
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bore some resemblance to those in the proposed system, This
analysis was also important in choosing strategies to contrast
for Study XI.
To accomplish t.' Lysi , mean scores on each of the ten
dimensions were computed for each rule separately. Correlations
between the means were then used in a principle- components factor
analysis and the simple factor structure rotated to yield?- ortho-
gonal factors. Using the means for each rule as input was neces-
sary since each subject responded to only one rule; in using this
approach it is assumed the means give a reliable estimate of
general perceptions of each rule. The factors are described in
Table 2. Examining the means for those rules loading highly on
each factor helps in interpreting the groupings of rules.
The strategies loading on factor I were uniformly expected to
be more difficult to keep in mind, to require more concentration
,
to require more time in making the choice, and to produce greater
confusion. A judicious lable for factor. I might be "tedious to
execute". AVG strategies and ALL versions dominated this grouping.
d
Strategies loading on Factor II were uniformly expected to be very
simple to k ind, tc quickly enable a final choice, and to
cause little con ,-^e c Subjects were quire confident they
could use these strategies without error. It is terr.it.ing to label
this the "quick and dirty" class——"easy to execute"' is probably
a less biased description * This group consisted entirely of Non-
compensatory strategies with FIRST versions dominating. Only two
strategies comprised the third factor: PIftST and AVGe : BEST*
Subjects thought they would be simple to keep in mind and readily

1%
defensible 'to others * and were quite confident they could use their,
without error. Additionally, both strategies received ratings
better than the overall mean on efficiency for making the most
ideal choice from a group of products* A possible label would
be "(fairly) simple and sound" although this may not do justice
to the underlying similarities. Both the fourth and fifth factors
accounted for only about 7% variance and were MAXIMX affij^MINIMAX
respectively, Interestingly, MAXIMAX was expected to be very easy
to use, comparing favorably with Group II strategies in that area,
but was viewed as much more readily defended and more likely to
lead to ideal choices than Group II strategies. MINIMAX, in contrast,
was uniformly expected to be very difficult to execute and unlikely
to yield ideal choices.
Study I was undertaken primarily to sort out the numerous
models for further examination. The data on subjective expecta-
tions are suggestive but their value is limited since the subjects
were responding only to descriptions. They had no necessary
experience actually applying t> a procedures described. Study II
was designed to c :he ac experiences to individuals
applying the respective ategi*
STUDY II: USAGE EXPERIENCE VTITH VARYr 'Df OPTIONS
Procedure and Subjects
Subjects were drawn from the same population as those in Study I
,
although none were repeaters. Each had volunteered and was compen-
sated. Each was told his task was to apply the procedure described
as accurately as possible in choosing among the sets of electronic
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resistors to be described. He was told to read the description
carefully until he was satisfied he clearly understood it, since
he wouldn't be allowed to refer back to it once he began the
choice task
.
After the introduction, each subject was randomly assigned
to one cell of the 3x4- design (three -'number of options"
conditions; four editions}. Final cell size was
fifteen. When the subject was through with the description a
he was given a booklet containing descriptions of the different
resistors. Ea Tas identified by a letter. He was
also given a response sheet which identified (by letter) the
resistors comprising . choice set". Ke was given two possible
responses foz^ each set: indicate by letter the resistor(s) he
chose or indicate that he could not make a choice. Subjects pro-
ceeded through the choice task at their own pace. After the task
was completed, a questionnaire asking about their experience with
the decision-;; -^resente
The four strav . -uprising the treatments in Study II were
AVG
e
:BEST; substantial^
priori plausibility lei of umer choice processes, as evi-
denced by t appears in the decision-
making literature. are Compsn: rwo Non-Compensatory.
Between them, they represent quite different assumptions. The other
consideration in selecting these was their ability to represent the
clusters discovered in Study I. AVG^BEST and CONJ:ALL are, res-
pectively, a Compensatory and Non-Compensatory model loading on
Factor I. LEX loaded highly on Factor II and AVG^BEST on Factor III

16
The descriptions used were identical to those used in Study I.
i
The descrij selves were equated for* clarity. At least
S5% of the Study I subjects exposed to each of these descriptions
had been able to replay it perfectly several minutes after reading
the descriptic
Fourteen sets were defined for each subject, consisting
of either two* s "• ten resistors per set. Two options are the
minimum necessary ice conflict to exist. Evidence sug-
gests an upper limit for comfortably handling information at around
six pieces £12]. Since three of these strategies required comparing
option vs. option j six options was expected to represent maximum
comfortable load. Ten options would then represent definite "over-
load" and comp I the sequence . Consumers may often find up
to ten options available . The three conditions attempted to create
minimal load, maximum "comfortable" lcad
s and overload.
Each resistor was described on four scales: load life stability,
flexibility of specifications, flammability , and delivery lead times.
Each scale was composed of five levels and each level was labeled:
greatly below averaj >elow average, average, somewhat
above average, av rerage, Che descriptions were
constructed rating occured an equal number of times
and so choice Lems were actual! let up (i.e., so there ware
few set? i to a "can't choose" response).
Analysis
For each subjects, the percentages of choice sets where correct
choices were mad? was computed. Mean accuracy percentages are shown
in Table 3. Table 3 also presents the means for each of the post-task
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questions subjects answered. Each cf these measures was analyzed
via a 3 x 4 factorial ANOVA.
As the number of options to be considered increased, the
accuracy with which decisions ware made decreased (F = ^5.07,
p < .001). Performance levels were fairly high with only two
options but deteriorated considerably for six or ten options.
The main effect for strategy was also significant (? = 5.60,
p < .001) and is due to the generally better execution shown by
subjects using L£X compared to other subjects. Most interesting,
the interaction effect was also significant (F = 5.55, p < .001).
This interaction is shown in Figure 2. Both AVGe and LEX were
executed almost perfectly for only two options, while even in
this simplest condition subjects using AVGj or CONJ made mis-
takes about a quarter cf the time. As the number of options
increased to six, success in applying AVG and AVG^ dropped
substantially (to arounc 50%). Success with CONJ remained stable
and success with LEX declined but was still fairly high. When the
subjects had ten options to consider in each choice set, they were
accurate only about heir the time regardless of which strategy
they attempted to use.
>le 1 the lower the score, the ^.er" the rating.
The general' scores indicate . subjects didn't feel applying
the respective choice procedures was a very exerting experience.
In one sense, these optimistic beliefs aren ; t surprising; the
strategies assigned were basic and straightforward. On the other
hand, the task structure did vary from fairly simple to fairly
taxing. The
•
previous analysis clearly demonstrated that subjects
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often had considerable difficulty with their cognitive comparisons
»
i
yet they were apparently not sensitive to their inefficiency.
The ANOVA for responses to th& question about usage diffi-
culty yielded significant main affects due to Options (F - 25.78.
p < .001} and to St y (F ~ 3.51, p < .02), Again the inter-
action effect was significant (F •" 2.44, p < .03). Figure 3 shows
the interaction. Subjects perceived clear differences in difficulty
as the number i ns increased. AVG and, LEX were accurately
e
perceived as simple to use for two options with AVGj and CONJ
causing more trouble* The pattern of perceived difficulty for
LEX matched the objective accuracy data fairly closely as the num-
ber of options increased. Perceived difficulty increased with
increasing options for both AVGe and AVG^ but not as fast as was
warranted by actual deterioration in accuracy. For six options,
subjects using CONJ felt more difficulty than their counterparts
using the AVG rules despite relatively more accurate performances
with CONJ.
Analysis of .responses tc questions on frequency of confusion
and difficulty in le in mind during the choice task
yielded fairly comparable results. For the confusion question,
the Strategy mads significant (F= 5,32,, p < .002) as
was the Option; . (F = ? < .003). For the ease of reten-
tion question, the Strategy effect (F - 21.11, p < .001) and the
Options affects (F - 13.27, p < .001) were likewise significant.
Neither interaction proved reliable. Perceived frequency of con-
fusion and difficulty in retention increased markedly only where
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ten options were being considered. Subjects reported more diffi-
i
culty executing CONJ on these measures, which was unexpected,
Interestingly, AVG, was reported as significantly less difficult
to keep in mind than A\'QQ (t - ^„3? 9 p < .001). This may have
been because AVG^ provided a natural starting point (the more
important dimension) on which x hov while AVG didn't.
Confidence ir ig made the correct choices decreased as
the number of options increased (F « 12.11, p < ,001). Handling
six options led to relatively lower confidence than two options
(t = 2.99, p < .05) and ten options created less confidence than
six (t * i*. 88, p < .01). The Strategy effect was not significant,
(To reemphasize, even though feelings of confidence differed across
conditions, confidence remained fairly high in general.) Correla-
tions between reported confidence and accuracy ratics were computed
separately for subjects in each Options condition. In each case,
the. adjusted correlation was positive and significant (two options:
r « .u-3; six c his: r = «4U ; . ten options: r - .32). The strength
of relation.?: t however, indicating that in the absence
of feedback about confidence doesn't necessarily reflect
performance.
Simplifying and ften be antagonistic goals
.
Subjects were cr>; her they felt th< of procedure they
had tried to apply is, in general, efficient as a way to make the
ideal choice from a group of options. A significant Strategy effect
was found (F = **.32, p < .01) with CONJ users more appreciative of
its optimising potential than users of other strategies. Interpre-
tations of CONJ as a non-maximising strategy may be worth reexamining,
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Finally s subjects were asked how often they seemed to use
that same type of strategy in making everyday choices in comparable
situations^ Neither main effect was significant but the interaction
was (F = 2.68, p < .02.) (see Figure *0. Where only two options
were being considered
s
subjects using AVGe reported most frequent
usage. For six options % AVG^ was reported as most frequently used.
For ten option situations , reported usage rates split apart more
dearly. CONJ was reported as most frequently used and LEX as
least frequently used.
DISCUSSION
The perspective guiding this research was that consumers con-
sider both the ultimate goal of consumption satisfaction and imme-
diate subgoals related to information handling difficulties when
entering a choice task. In certain situations the former may
dominate the latter and vice-versa. The choice strategy adopted
can thus be modeled in basic expectancy theory terms, i.e., in
terras of subjective expectations about the outcomes of applying
a strategy and subjective valuations of these outcomes. As a
prelude to general hypotheses about the conditions in which con-
sumers tend to use one or another choice^ strategy , sub-jective
expectations about the use of the strategies from a simplifying
view and an optimizing view were examined,
These subjects were apparently not very sensitive to their
frailties as information processors. A consumer may not feel strained
applying a strategy even though he is applying it inaccurately.
Based on his inaccuracy, we might be tempted to label the strategy
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difficult to use and infer that he is unlikely to try it under
difficult conditions. But objective difficulty is not the rele-
vant criteria; subjectively experienced strain is. In the absence
of feedback a consumer is unlik ;ly to learn of hij inadequacy
in executing the strategy. If he. didn't feel strained, he would
regard that strategy as a likely candidate vhete simplifying is
important to him. Reliable feedback is unlikely in most decision
making settings in which consumers operate. Farther, the only
feedback is whether the product chosen actually led to desired
outcomes • If a consumer decides he made a poor choice, he cannot
easily sort out the locus of his problem. Was his original subjec-
tive evaluation policy wrong? Or was his policy fine but poorly
executed?
Executing a compensatory strategy under moderate information
load intuitively seems fairly exerting. This data indicate accurate
execution is unlikely except under light loads. Nevertheless, these
subjects didn't feel overly strained by compensatory strategies.
This argues that consumers may not avoid such strategies when sim-
plifying is necessary. Of course, an alternate explanation of
these results is that the subjects did in fact avoid the compensa-
tory strategy they wex*e . mentally doing something else
when taxed. Hence, their poor accuracy. Testing that explanation
via more direct questionnings than were used here seems desirable.
Results for the CONJ strategy were somewhat unexpected.
Applying the CONJ strategy was not expected to be a demanding
task; indeed, Einhorn [6] has characterized it as relatively simple
and his logic is intuitively appealing. Perceptions of naive subjects
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in Study I suggested that whether or not CONJ is difficult to exe-
cute might depend on whether or not it is coupled with a "choosa
the first" rule, In Study II j a CONJ.ALI* strategy was used by .
the subjects. Subjects were su prisingiy inaccurate in using
CONJ t ALL. for two-option choices but relatively more accurate for
six-option choices . However, subjective user's reports indicated
COMJ:ALL caused relatively more confusion and retention problems.
Thus, naive subjects and experienced users tended to feel CQNJ: ALL
was not necessarily as simple a strategy as was predicted,,
What would xake CQNJ seem cognitively difficult to use? The
user must ke&z in mind something special about each dimensi.on
the exact cutoff point, The only other strategy* forcing him to
keep salient some special aspect of the dimensions was the AVG^
strategy. Retaining the four cutoffs apparently required more
concentration than retaining only one differential weight* (AVG^)
or no special features (AV<3e and LEX). When might a CQNJ strategy
be simpler to apply? In this . , the cutoffs imposed were set
at different levels along the dimensions (two at "average* two
at "somewhat above average"). Perhaps CONJ is easier to use where
all cutoffs occur at trie same point (e.g., "average"). CONJ may
also be easier for "either-or" or "possession" type dimensic
("blue vs. not blue", "size 12 vs. not size 12", "has power steering
vs. doesn't").
CONJ-s relatively high potential for optimizing in the eyes of
its users was also somewhat unexpected* CONJ is the only one of
the fcur strategies in Study II that didn't entail direct product
vs. product comparisons. Choosing an ideal option does of course
imply conceiving the necessary features of such an option, then

demanding those, Some prior discussions of '-minimal criteria"
strategies have characterized these as non-optimising Ee,g a » ?, "
19 3, However » such procedures have proven popular in research on
prcbism solving processes [13]. Kanouse and Hanson [11] drew
on prior work about the distribut oi >f outcomes people expect
in their life to argue "it may be easier to obtain happiness by
maximizing the proportion of nonnegative outcomes than by maxi-
raizing the positivity of individual outcomes [11, p. 53]." 'The
notion is that tradeoff strategies don't maximize satisfaction
for a consumer who can choose just one option but seeks multiple
satisfactory outcomes. How high the criteria are set in CONJ
models makes a difference in whether they connote a "minimum
qualifier 5 ' or "ideal-point matching'* strategy. Contrast "he'll
date anyone who has X and Y and Z" with "he won't date anyone
unless she has X and Y and Z"
Executing a CONJ strategy entails counting the number of satis-
factory attributes. MAXIMAX pictures an analogous counting process
for multidimensic roducts. Subjects in Study I thought MAXIMAX
would be a ve ay to make ideal choices, The results
for CONJ and MAXIMAX sugj consumers may see counting, with
cutoffs , as a viable oj
Subjects did not appaxv Lnd any of these choice strategies
very strainful or cos wonde tether differences of
the magnitude found will actually be a factor when consumers adopt
a choice strategy. But only one ingredient of information load was
varied in this study: number of options* Time pressure and distrac-
tions were both minimal, and the number of cues which could possibly

be considered per option wa J :.ted. In many decision environments,
combinations of these factors contribute in making the information
processing task much more tedious. The information available here
was expressed in common scale uaits which should itself simplify
processing tasks, especially where averaging is used* Mixtures
of qualitative and quant re data will often confront the consumer.
Viewed from this perspective , finding the perceived difficulty of
using various strategies changed as options increased suggests
strongly that even greater variations should be expected under even
more realistically difficult conditions.
Other methods individuals may use to simplify choice tasks
have been suggested. For example, where prior information about
the products has been encountered piece by piece, the person will
have created and stored a global affect impression for each option,
When pressed , the most accessible piece of data to consult will
often be this single affect index, (tridimensional affect is
of course th^ core notion in original "attitude" concepts;
global affective impressions are created in the first place to be
•used by the indivic hen me gorous processing isn't feasible.)
In employing "affect-referral" [2**] as a choice strategy s no integra-
tion or reintegration tribute specific data occurs. The consumer
merely consults : ed global affect ratings for direc-
tionality or compares them to see which is best. This is probably
a popular tactic for consumers under time pressure., although subjects
in this study couldn't have used it. As another example, Siovic and
Lichtenstein [19; see also 221, have described a "starting point and
adjustment" strategy. The iudge focuses initially on an option's

status on a single salient dimension, then adjusts the starting judgirent
in a general , irofcggci.se way to take into account the other data. An
interesting hypothesis is that people setting out to apply a com-
pensatory strategy really wind up merely using a starting point
and adjustment procedure.
A viable technique for influencing someone's final choice is
to convince him to apply a particular choice procedure, presumably
one which favors the product you advocate. In promoting a particular
strategy, its benefits vis-a-vis simplifying, defensibility , etc.
might be stressed. But two sources of breakdown can occur in such
a persuasion attempt. He may remain unconvinced to apply the recom-
mended procedure. Or* even if completely convinced and trying > he
may ?tblow" the execution and still make seme choice other than the.
intended one. Study II in effect set up the latter situation.
Apparently, poor execution of even basic choice procedures should
be anticipated unless the choice environment is structured into
a very simple [see 26 j. A two-stage communication campaign
is thus necessary if the final choice is to be systematically
influenced: (l) the campaign should assist the consumer in struc-
turing his mul ernative, multidimensional dilemma into a very
simple problem, then (2) the ultimate choice strategy can be recommended.
Without step one, chances are high that the consumer will not execute
the final choice policy he himself wishes to with very high accuracy.
The outcome will not oe the one sought by either party, the consumer
or the marketer. Taking a larger perspective, it is unlikely that
any marketing program can be efficient unless intended consumers can
successfully execute, their intended evaluation procedures . Only products
for which no true subjective demand exists benefit from errors in
ce processes, and hence,, from overwhelmed consumers.
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FOOTNOTES
^o avoid semantic problems, the following definitions are used
in the text. A dimension is a continuum of characteristics,
traits, attributes, outcomes, or values. Points or levels along
a dimension are characteristics. Thus, "flammability" is a
dimension composed of multiple levels* Any one of those levels,
such as "greatly above average flammahility" , is a characteris-
tic . A piece of data describing a characteristic of a product
is a cue . Cues then correspond to specific characteristics
,
not dimensions. •
*To be perfectly clear, with a compensatory model cues necessarily
have a compensating influence on each other. In a noncompensa-
tory model , compensation may take place in limited cases and in
a limited sense.
Tver-sky proposes that the ordering of the sequence is probabilistic,
whereas more traditional LFX models assume a stable a priori
ordering of the dimensions by the individual.
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Table 2
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR FIFTEEN CHOICE STRATEGIES
FACTOR
( 34.1%)
STRATEGY
AVG^: all
u
AVG^ : best
• all
CONJ- S 3.11
AYG^: all
LOADING
.89
= 87
.86
.82
-79
CHARACTERIZATION
*more difficult to keep in mind
*more concentration to execute
^requires more time to finish
the choice task
*more frequent confusion
II
(32%)
LEX .96
DISJ: first .94
CONJ: first .87
CONJ-SEQ: first .78
*very simple to keep in mind
^require little time to finish
the choice task
^rarely confusing
"high confidence that execution
would be error-free
til AYG6 : first .S3
(18%)
AVG : best ,74
(7%)
MAXIKAX >74
*fairly simple to keep in mind
*readily defensible to others
*high confidence that execution
would be error-free
*fairly efficient in leading to
ideal choice
(7%) MINIMA* .64
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Figure 1
A TAXONOMY OF CHOICE STRATEGIES
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